The burden of Fundamentality: Metaphysical ambiguities and the issue of Superdeterminism

Abstract

In this paper we approach the problem of superdeterminism from a novel point of view, highlighting its character as a more metaphysical than scientific proposition. First, we introduce a distinction between two types of superdeterministic theories, naïve (NSD) and metaphysical (MSD), and argue how NSD presents significant epistemic flaws. We show how NSD justifies itself through claims to fundamentality, thus connoting itself as a metaphysical theory rather than a scientific one. We finally illustrate that the most developed MSD model so far, Invariant Set Theory, implicitly proposes a confused form of priority monism. Our paper thus reinforces the thesis that theories should demonstrate rather than assume fundamentality and that it is methodologically flawed for a theory to assume its own fundamentality for the sole purpose of defending against criticisms.