French on London and Bauer, and QBism
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Abstract
In this article I compare two interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) that draw inspiration from phenomenology: the London-Bauer-French interpretation (hereafter LBF) as articulated by Steven French, and QBism. I give special attention to certain disagreements between QBism and LBF identified French's work, as well as French's related claims that QBism may be at odds with key ideas in phenomenology. My main finding is that QBism does not fare so badly with phenomenology as French makes out; in particular it can be made compatible with Zahavi's correlationism and Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity, both of which strongly inform LBF. Nevertheless, I concur with French's argument that QBism is incompatible with the conception of quantum measurement in LBF, hence also with that of Merleau-Ponty, as the latter based his own analysis on that of London and Bauer. I explain why I find QBism's account preferable in this case.